Explain to me why Air France flight 447's anti-stall system didn't kick in? It's designed to work when the nose is too high?

Explain to me why Air France flight 447's anti-stall system didn't kick in? It's designed to work when the nose is too high?

The French's noses are always so high in the air that they had to disable it or they'd never be able to go anywhere.

What anti-stall system?
This is a fly by wire system, which means everything is handled by a computer. When the autopilot detected inconsistent data it disconnected, leaving the human crew in charge. In that configuration, the computer's stall protection routine is deactivated, which is expected, as the data the computer uses to detect stall were already deemed to be unreliable.

It's a fly-by-wire system and the autopilot kicked out probably because the pitot tubes were blocked with ice. It dropped into Alternate Mode, and in ALT1 mode high angle of attack protection may be lost and low energy (level flight stall) protection is lost. On other words, the pilots must bear this in mind themselves

It seems the handling pilot did not understand what was happening and perhaps lost sight of the absolute basic of airmanship, which is "First fly the aircraft". From the records he was holding the stick fully back all the way down and did not even consider lowering the nose to get out of the stall.

The stall warning did activate twice when the initial upset happened.

Once the pitot tube froze the plane's computer no longer was receiving accurate airspeed and altitude data. The plane went into a rapid climb and slowed down quickly. During the upset the autopilot disconnected and control reverted to a much more sensitive alternate control law. The automatic stall protection no longer works in the alternate control law mode.

The reserve co-pilot took manual control, the airplane went through several roll reversals as he adjusted to the sensitive controls. At the same time he sharply pulled the stick back into a 7,000 feet per minute climb. While stall warning activated briefly, the plane slowed down rapidly from 274 knots to 52 knots. At that airspeed the stall warning system no longer works.

Once the plane stalled it started to rapidly lose altitude. The reserve co-pilot initially reacted to the altitude loss by pulling back on his joystick, and seemed to ignore low air speed. At the same time the other co-pilot sitting in the left seat pushed his stick forward. Their actions cancelled each other out. At this point the aircraft was descending with the angle of attack of over 30 degrees and engines running at 100%. This condition was outside the Air Data computer's programming and it considered the airspeed data invalid. When the crew finally attempted the proper stall recovery technique: i.e. Adding power and pushing the nose down, the A330 did begin to recover and accelerated into the lower limit of the stall warning system and the stall stall warning and stickshaker activated again. The stall warning then continued to sound intermittently for the remainder of the flight, during which the angle of attack never dropped below 35 degrees.

This confused the crew even more. To them it looked like their actions were having exactly the opposite effect: pushing the stick forward activated the stall warning and pulling it back silenced it. They didn't realize that all they had to do is keep accelerating right through the stall warning limits and they would have recovered.